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The Relationship between the Frequency of News Release and the Information 









This paper shows that the degree of information asymmetry is lower for firms with more 
frequent news releases. The relation holds for various measures of information 
asymmetry such as the probability of information-based trading (PIN), permanent price 
impact, and adverse selection component of bid-ask spread, even after adjusting for 
endogeneity between news release and information asymmetry. By decomposing the PIN 
into intensities of uninformed and informed trades, similarly to Brown and Hillegeist 
[2007, Review of Accounting Studies 12, 443-477], we find that intensity of uninformed 
trading increases much more than that of informed trading for firms with more frequent 
news releases. As a result, information asymmetry, as is measured by PIN, decreases for 
such firms due to the large increase in the intensity of uninformed trading. Our findings 
highlight not only the importance of news releases in leveling the playing field of 
investors but also the role of uninformed investors in reducing trading cost due to 
information asymmetry.  
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The Relationship between the Frequency of News Release and the Information 
Asymmetry: The Role of Uninformed Trading 
 
Abstract 
This paper shows that the degree of information asymmetry is lower for firms with more 
frequent news releases. The relation holds for various measures of information 
asymmetry such as the probability of information-based trading (PIN), permanent price 
impact, and adverse selection component of bid-ask spread, even after adjusting for 
endogeneity between news release and information asymmetry. By decomposing the PIN 
into intensities of uninformed and informed trades, similarly to Brown and Hillegeist 
[2007, Review of Accounting Studies 12, 443-477], we find that intensity of uninformed 
trading increases much more than that of informed trading for firms with more frequent 
news releases. As a result, information asymmetry, as is measured by PIN, decreases for 
such firms due to the large increase in the intensity of uninformed trading. Our findings 
highlight not only the importance of news releases in leveling the playing field of 
investors but also the role of uninformed investors in reducing trading cost due to 
information asymmetry.  
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1. Introduction 
“…..The laws and rules that govern the securities industry in the United States derive 
from a simple and straightforward concept: all investors, whether large institutions or private 
individuals, should have access to certain basic facts about an investment prior to buying it, 
and so long as they hold it…..”     (SEC Mission Statement) 
 
Market regulatory agencies tend to view regular disclosure of public information 
by managers as primary means of maintaining an orderly financial market, believing that 
such disclosure levels the playing field for all investors as it reduces the degree of 
information asymmetry among investors. For example, the US Securities Exchange 
Commission (hereafter, SEC) enacted Regulation Fair Disclosure (REG FD) which 
prohibits managers from making selective disclosures to specific investors without 
accompanying public disclosure of similar information to all investors. 1 However, 
existing research in finance and accounting that examines the degree of information 
asymmetry around news events shows that information asymmetry increases 
immediately before and after events such as earnings and dividend announcements. For 
example, Krinsky and Lee (1996) and Cong, Hoitash and Krishnan (2010) find that the 
degree of information asymmetry increases after earnings announcements. Koski and 
Michaley (2000) find similar results before dividend announcements. However, the 
results of these event studies might strongly reflect the short-term impact of trading by 
informed investors who react immediately to news events.2 If uninformed investors do 
not react to information immediately with the same trading intensity as informed 
investors, it might take longer time for the impact of uninformed trading to materialize in 
                                                 
1 The disclosure is done through SEC filing using Form 8K.  
2 In contrast with previous studies, a recent study by Amiram, Ownes and Rozenbaum (2012) show that 
analysts forecast announcements decrease information asymmetry around the announcement event.  
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market prices. Thus, a narrow window around event dates applied in these studies might 
not be able to capture the response of uninformed investors. To complement the prior 
event studies, our paper measures the levels of disclosure by the frequency of news 
release and relates them to the intensities of informed trading and uninformed trading. 
Thus, the resultant information asymmetry is measured over a time horizon longer than 
that in previous event studies. The primary goal of this paper is to reconcile the 
seemingly opposing implications of previous event studies by studying the cross sectional 
relation between the frequency of news release and the degree of information asymmetry 
which is measured over a longer time frame.  
We test the above objective using a sample of 1031 firms whose common stocks 
were traded on the NYSE during the calendar year 2004. We measure the frequency of 
news release based on all firm-specific news appearing on www.MarketWatch.com. This 
website receives news stories from over 20 high profile financial news media that cover 
press releases by firms, SEC filings and other firm specific news. Such a broad coverage 
of news allows us to make general statements about the effect of news releases on the 
information asymmetry among investors, instead of focusing on a few specific news 
events such as earnings and dividend announcements. In this paper, we use the 
Probability of Information-based Trading, PIN (Easley et al. 1996), the decomposed bid 
ask spread (Huang and Stoll, 1997), and the permanent price impact of trades (Hasbrouck 
1991) as measures of information asymmetry. However, we use the PIN for reporting our 
main results and present robustness test results for the other measures.  
Prior literature posits that the frequency of news release and measures of 
information asymmetry could be endogenously determined. Coller and Yohn (1997) 
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suggest that managers release information to reduce information asymmetry in the stock 
market, where they find that management forecasts reduce information asymmetry. 
Brown and Hillegeist (2007) model an endogenous structure for the relation between 
earnings disclosure quality and information asymmetry.3 Similarly, news media are more 
likely to cover firms where information asymmetry is greater since the demand for news 
might be higher for these firms. In our tests, in addition to a single equation model, we 
also control for this endogenous relation between information asymmetry and the 
frequency of news release by using a 2SLS estimation model. We find that information 
asymmetry is lower for firms with more frequent news release, which is in contrast to the 
findings by previous event studies that show information asymmetry increases around 
public announcement events.4 Our results also support the finding in a recent study by 
Tetlock (2010) that examines the relations between public news and reversal of daily 
stock returns and volume-induced momentum, among other relations, and suggests public 
news releases mitigate information asymmetry.  
We further explore the channel that leads to the negative relation between the 
frequency of public news release and information asymmetry. Although the trading of 
both informed and uninformed investors jointly determines the degree of information 
asymmetry of the market, both types of investors may have different incentives to rely on 
public information in forming their trading strategies. Previous studies of asymmetric 
information and investor trading have mostly focused on the strategic behavior of 
                                                 
3 Recent empirical works relating firms’ information disclosure to the cost of capital treat disclosure as an 
endogenous choice variable; see, e.g., Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) and Cohen (2003).  
4 Our cross-sectional finding does not necessarily contradict those in the event studies. Information 
asymmetry around news events may be affected more by the trading by informed investors with private 
interpretation of news (Kim and Verrecchia, 1994 and 1997), while information asymmetry measured over 
a long horizon may reflect more of uninformed trading as a result of more information being incorporated 
into prices. 
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informed investors. For example, Bagnoli and Watts (1998) show a model where 
informed traders gather private information in anticipation of a news release and take 
positions to profit from this information. They show that informed trading is more 
aggressive and prices become more informative around public news releases. Kim and 
Verrecchia (1994) present a model where information asymmetry increases instead after 
the news release as informed traders gather private information and use them to make 
superior judgments of the public information. Although the implications for information 
asymmetry might be different, the intensity of informed trading increases around a news 
release in both models. On the other hand, if informed traders deem a news release to be 
a substitute for private information, then they are less likely to gather private information 
before the release of public information and trade on it (Grundy and McNichols, 1989). 
Thus, a news release could either increase or decrease the intensity of informed trading 
and the degree of information asymmetry.5  
News releases could also affect the incentive of uninformed traders to trade. 
Uninformed traders are more likely to be small and/or individual investors that are 
resource-constrained and less likely to gather costly private information. Hence, they are 
likely to rely on news releases to make their trading decisions.  For example, Lee (1992) 
and Barber and Odean (2008) find empirical evidence that individual investors' trades are 
likely to cluster in firms with more frequent news release. However, it is ambiguous how 
uninformed investors would trade strategically in the presence of news releases. For 
example, if uninformed traders believe that informed traders are more likely to trade 
around news releases, uninformed investors would have incentives to stay away from 
trading to avoid being taken advantage by better informed traders, reducing trades around 
                                                 
5 See Livne (2000) for a model that incorporates both characteristics of news releases. 
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news releases. On the other hand, Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) show that, if uninformed 
investors have the discretion to time trades, they have incentives to cluster trades when 
market is thick enough to reduce adverse selection costs. Therefore, whether uninformed 
investors increase trades or avoid trading around public news releases is an empirical 
question. Also, individual investors might engage in trades that provide liquidity to 
institutional investors, resulting increased uninformed trades around news events (see 
Kaniel, Saar, and Titman, 2008; Kaniel, Liu, Saar, and Titman, 2012).  
To examine how informed and uninformed trades respond to news releases, we 
decompose the PIN into trading intensities of informed and uninformed traders, similarly 
to Brown and Hillegeist (2007) who decompose the PIN and examine each component 
separately.6  By decomposing the PIN, we examine the impacts of news release on the 
trading intensities of informed and uninformed traders separately, which is one of the key 
features of this paper. We find a significantly higher trading intensity of uninformed 
traders in firms with more frequent stream of news release. Though the trading intensity 
of informed traders is also higher in firms with more frequent news release, it is 
outweighed by the increase in uninformed trading, resulting in a lower PIN for these 
firms. As is suggested by existing market microstructure theories (Glosten and Milgrom, 
1985; Kyle, 1985; Easley et al., 1996), the presence of uninformed traders mitigates the 
information asymmetry in the market. Hence, for firms with more frequent news release, 
the significant increase in trading by uninformed traders relative to informed traders 
explains the lower information asymmetry for these firms.  
                                                 
6 A recent paper by Wei, Gerace and Frino (2012) studies the time series properties of informed and 
uninformed trading intensities estimated from PIN and their relation to size, value and liquidity. 
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Our study contributes to the understanding of the effects of news releases on 
investors’ trading behavior and price formation,7 particularly in relation to the role of 
uninformed traders. We show that the reduced information asymmetry in firms with more 
frequent news release is driven by the increased trading by uninformed investors who 
might base their trading decisions primarily on public news. Therefore, the trades of 
uninformed investors are crucial in bringing about the economic benefits of lowering 
information asymmetry due to increased disclosure. This finding also supports market 
regulators’ objective to increase the frequency of news disclosure and to level the playing 
field for all investors. Finally, prior literature has shown that information asymmetry 
affects the cost of capital and expected return of stocks.8 Our finding highlights the 
potential role of news release in reducing the cost of capital since greater frequency of 
news release is likely to decrease the information asymmetry.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the 
construction of key variables and the empirical methodology; Section 3 describes the 
sample and data; Section 4 presents the results of empirical analyses; and finally Section 
5 concludes the paper. 
 
  
                                                 
7 There is also a growing literature studying the trading and price patterns in response to public information 
arrival as measured by media news or firm announcements. For example, Kalev, Liu, Pham and Jarnecic 
(2004) study the intraday return volatility around firm-specific announcements; Tetlock (2010) and 
Riordan, Storkenmaier, Wagener and Zhang (2012) examine the information asymmetry metrics around 
media news days.  
8 Previous literature has shown that information asymmetry impedes investment and increases the cost of 
capital (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Easley and O’Hara, 2004). See Verrecchia, 2001 for a survey. 
Easley, Hvidkjaer and O'Hara (2002, 2010) show that information asymmetry is a factor that impacts the 
cross section of expected return.  .  
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2. Variable Construction and Methodology 
2.1 Measuring the frequency of news release 
Our source of news release is all news items appearing on the website 
www.MarketWatch.com for each firm. The website is a financial information services 
provider wholly owned by Dow Jones & Company, Inc. There are two merits in using 
news released on www.MarketWatch.com as a proxy of firm-specific public information. 
First, www.MarketWatch.com provides a broad coverage of relevant firm-specific public 
news, including company press release via Business Wire, PR Newswire, Market Wire, 
and Prime Zone, SEC filings by Edgar Online, and other sources such as Reuters, New 
York Times, CBS News, FT.com, TheStreet.com, The Wall Street Journal Online, among 
others. Second, the news on this website is displayed in a manner that allows us to easily 
search and download the date, time, and headline for each news item using an automated 
computer algorithm, thus making it convenient to collect a large amounts of data.9  
We measure the frequency of news for each firm as the number of days with news 
(NEWSDAYS) appearing on www.MarketWatch.com during the sample period. An 
alternative measure of the frequency of news could be the number of news items 
(YEARNEWS) appearing on www.MarketWatch.com during the sample period. 
Compared with the number of news items, the number of news days has the following 
advantages as the measure of news frequency. First, the use of number of news days 
mitigates the problem of double counting the same news story reported by different news 
sources which appears as multiple news items on the website. Thus, a higher number of 
news items during a specific day may not necessarily implies greater flow of information. 
                                                 
9 Zdorovtsov (2009) also uses the news extracted from this source to study the effect of information flow 
on trading activities and stock return volatility. 
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Second, the distribution of the number of news items is highly skewed and is dominated 
by a few firms which have a large number of news items almost every day. In 2004, the 
median (mean) number of news items per firm is 86 (116) for all firms in our sample, 
while the median (mean) value of the number of days with news is 49 (58). The skewness 
of the distribution of the number of news items is much higher than that of the number of 
news days.10 Although there might be a loss of information from assigning the value of 1 
irrespective of the number of news item during a specific day, the use of number of news 
days has the benefit of mitigating any potential distortion in the data as mentioned above. 
Therefore, our discussion is based on the results using the number of news days as the 
proxy of news frequency. Measuring the frequency of news using the number of news 
items gives quantitatively similar results which are not reported but available from the 
authors upon request.  
 
2.2 Measuring information asymmetry 
 Our primary measure of information asymmetry is the probability of information-
based trading (PIN) which is calculated as the relative intensity of informed trading to the 
total trading. The intensities of informed trading and uninformed trading are estimated 
from the sequential trade model described by Easley et al. (1996). In this model, both 
informed trades and uninformed trades are assumed to arrive in the market following an 
independent Poisson process. Informed trades arrive at the rate of MU only on the days 
when a private news event occurs with a probability of ALPHA. Informed traders buy 
when the news is positive and sell when the news is negative. The arrival rates of 
                                                 
10 We use a logarithmic transformation of the frequency of news release to mitigate the effect of the skewed 
distribution of news across firms. Our results also hold if we mitigate the effect of outliers by excluding 
firms falling in the top and bottom 1% of the distribution of the measure of news frequency. 
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uninformed buy and sell trades are both EPSILON and are independent of the occurrence 
and sign of the private news event. Thus the average number of informed trades is the 
product of ALPHA and MU, and that of uninformed trades is (2 * EPSILON). We use 
(ALPHA * MU) as the proxy of the intensity of informed trading (INFORM) and (2 * 
EPSILON) as the proxy of the intensity of uninformed trading (UNINFORM). The 
relative intensity of informed trading to uninformed trading is the probability of 
information-based trading (PIN) which is calculated as the ratio of the informed trading 





ALPHA MU EPSILON INFORM UNINFORM
   .
 (1) 
 
We estimate the individual components in Eq. (1) by numerically maximizing the 
likelihood function as specified in Easley et al. (1996).11 However, Yan and Zhang (2012) 
find that boundary solutions in numerical maximization methods can cause a bias in the 
estimate of PIN. Thus, we adopt the algorithm in Yan and Zhang (2012) to select various 
sets of initial values for optimization, and choose the set of parameter estimates 
producing the highest value of the likelihood function.12  
 
  
                                                 
11 See Easley et al. (1996) for the details of the model and the estimation of the model parameters.  
12 Lin and Ke (2011) document a downward bias in estimating PIN caused by the floating-point exception 
(FPE). We assume an equal arrival rate for the uninformed buy and sell trades, which significantly reduces 
but does not totally remove the occurrence of FPE.  
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2.3 Modeling the relationship between the frequency of news release and information 
asymmetry 
2.3.1 Single equation estimation 
The primary objective of our paper is to study the relation between firm specific 
news release and information asymmetry. We start with a single equation OLS model that 
examines this relationship. To model the information asymmetry, we follow the empirical 
specification in Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995) and Roulstone (2003):   
 
0 1 2 3
4 5 6
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
i i i i
i i i i
Ln PIN Ln NEWSDAYS Ln VOL Ln SIZE
Ln NANLY Ln PRICE Ln RETVOL
   
   
   
    . (2) 
 
where we include NEWSDAYS in addition to the variables used in prior studies. Other 
variables include trading volume (VOL) measured as the average daily number of trades 
during the year,13 firm size (SIZE) measured as the average daily market capitalization 
during the year, the number of analysts following (NANLY) measured as the number of 
analysts releasing yearly earnings forecasts for a firm during the year, the price level 
(PRICE) measured as the average daily closing stock price during the year, and return 
volatility (RETVOL) measured as the standard deviation of daily stock returns during the 
year. As large trading volume enables market makers to reduce inventory risk (Stoll, 
1978; Ho and Stoll, 1980), recover losses from trading with informed traders and reduce 
the bid-ask spread (McInish and Wood, 1992), we expect VOL to have a negative impact 
on the PIN. As larger firms have better information environment, thus lower information 
                                                 
13 We measure volume as the number of trades following the finding by Jones, Kaul and Lipson (1994) that 
number of transactions is more relevant for studying the impact of trading on stock price. Alternative 
measures of trading volume, such as share turnover (the fraction of shares outstanding traded), yield similar 
results.  
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asymmetry, we expect firm size (SIZE) to have a negative impact on the PIN. Brennan 
and Subrahmanyam (1995) and Roulstone (2003) find that the number of analysts 
following (NANLY) is negatively related with the measures of illiquidity and information 
asymmetry since analysts supply information to the market. Due to discreteness in prices, 
stocks with a low price (PRICE) usually tend to have high spreads and high price impact 
of trades (Jegadeesh and Subrahmanyam, 1993). Finally, prior research has documented a 
negative relationship between return volatility and liquidity as market makers face higher 
inventory risk and adverse selection risk when the stock returns are more volatile (Stoll, 
1978; Jegadeesh and Subrahmanyam, 1993). Thus, we expect a positive coefficient on 
RETVOL. 
 
2.3.2 System of equations 
It is possible that firms with higher information asymmetry choose to release 
greater amount of news to reduce the high information asymmetry. Coller and Yohn 
(1997) suggest that firms issue management forecasts to reduce information asymmetry 
prior to an earnings announcement. Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) indicate that firms may 
strategically pick the level of disclosure by choosing between different financial reporting 
regimes. Thus the firms’ disclosure policy may be affected by the information asymmetry 
in the market. In addition, news media are also likely to gather information about firms 
with high information asymmetry since it is likely that there is a greater demand for 
information about such firms. Hence, news release and information asymmetry are likely 
to be endogenously determined and need to be modeled simultaneously. We use a 
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simultaneous equation system that models both the information asymmetry and the 
frequency of news release.  
The model for information asymmetry remains the same as described above in 
equation (2). To model the frequency of news release, we draw from prior literature on 
the determinants of firms’ disclosure policy (Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Brown and 
Hillegeist, 2007). Specifically, in addition to the proxy for information asymmetry, we 
include several variables as control variables. Firm size (SIZE) is an important 
determinant for the press to follow a firm. Larger firms might have more news to be 
released, thus being covered more often by the press. The number of analysts following 
(NANLY) is also another important determinant of news coverage. Analysts generate 
information about firms through their recommendations and reports and these are likely 
to be picked up by the press. Also, as the press is likely to follow firms in which there is 
greater interest from institutional investors, we expect the number of institutional 
investors holding a firm’s stocks (NINST) is positively related to the number of news 
days. Firms with greater analysts’ forecast error in the quarterly earnings announcements 
(FERR) are also more likely to be covered in the news. We measure FERR in three steps. 
In the first step we measure how far away the analyst forecast is from the actual earnings 
by calculating the absolute value of the difference between the consensus quarterly 
earnings forecast in the first month of every quarter and the reported quarterly earnings. 
Second, we scale the above absolute difference by the average daily price during the first 
month of every quarter to reduce heteroskedasticity. Finally, we average the values from 
the second step over the 5-year period before the sample year to obtain FERR. When a 
firm raises large amount of capital, it is also likely to be covered by the press due to 
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investor demand for information of the firm. We include a dummy variable indicating 
new financing activity (NEWFIN) which takes the value of one if a firm has any equity 
issuance above $10 million or any debt issuance above $1 million in the current and the 
following fiscal years, and takes the value of zero otherwise. Lastly, we include industry 
dummy variables (IND).14 All the variables, which are logarithm transformed except for 
the dummy variables, are expected to capture the cross-sectional variation in the demand 
for news by market participants. Thus, the model for the frequency of news release is 
specified as follows, 
 
0 1 2 3
9
4 5 6 ,
1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
i i i i
i i i k k i i
k
Ln NEWSDAYS Ln PIN Ln SIZE Ln NANLY
Ln NINST Ln FERR NEWFIN IND
   
    

   
     . (3) 
 
We estimate the relationship between the information asymmetry (PIN) in Eq. (2) 
and the frequency of news release (NEWSDAYS) in Eq. (3) using two-stage least square 
(2SLS) regression. Specifically, the variables NINST, FERR, NEWFIN and INDs are 
unique instrumental variables for NEWSDAYS, and PRICE and RETVOL are those for the 
information asymmetry variable following Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995).  
 
3. Sample and Data 
3.1 Sample 
Our sample comprises 1031 firms with stocks traded on NYSE during the 
calendar year 2004. We start the sample selection process by including all common 
                                                 
14 Firms are classified into 10 industries and the industry classification scheme is obtained from the website 
of Kenneth French. 
 16
stocks which were traded on the NYSE during the year and included in the CRSP 
database. We include only NYSE stocks in our analysis to abstract away from differences 
in market making mechanisms between different exchanges. Stocks other than common 
stocks, i.e., those with share code other than 10 and 11, are excluded, since their trading 
characteristics might differ from those of ordinary equities. Consistent with extant 
literature, we only include stocks whose average monthly closing price in the year is 
greater than $5 to avoid the influence of dollar and penny stocks. After applying the 
above filters, 184 stocks out of the original 1535 stocks are dropped from the sample. In 
estimating PIN we lose a further 243 stocks which have extremely large daily number of 
trades that causes data overflow during the MLE estimation. We also require the stocks to 
have news appearing on www.MarketWatch.com during 2004, which restricts the final 
sample to 1031 stocks. 
We obtain the data from the following sources: news data from 
www.MarketWatch.com, daily stock price and trading data from CRSP, intraday 
transaction data from NYSE TAQ to estimate the PIN and other information asymmetry 
proxies, quarterly earnings and capital financing data from COMPUSTAT, analysts’ 
earnings forecasts and other related data from I/B/E/S, and institutional holding data from 
Thomson Financial (13F filing).  
 
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics of the firms in the sample are reported in Table 1. In our 
sample, the average firm is reported in the news for about 58 days during the year 2004, 
and has 116 articles written about it in 2004. The relatively frequent news release for the 
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firms in our sample is most likely due to the fact that these are relatively large firms listed 
on the NYSE that attract extensive attention from investors. The average market 
capitalization (SIZE) of firms in our sample is $ 2.6 billion. The firms in our sample are 
also actively traded. An average firm in the sample has about 782 trades in a day. There 
are about 55 informed trades and 714 uninformed trades in a day for an average firm in 
the sample.15 The average probability of information-based trading (PIN) for the firms in 
the sample is about 10%.16 The average firm in our sample has about 7 analysts that 
release annual earnings forecast, indicating that analysts actively follow the sample firms. 
Further, average daily return volatility (RETVOL) is 1.83% and the average price is about 
$32.  The average forecast error in the consensus analyst earnings forecast (FERR) is 
about 55 basis points of the stock price. Finally, about 83% of firms in the sample have 
new financing activity during either the sample year or the following year.  
Table 2 reports the correlation coefficients between different firm characteristics. 
Both Pearson and Spearman (in italic) correlation coefficients are reported in this table. 
For most variable pairs, the two correlation coefficients do not differ significantly, which 
indicates that non-linearity in the relationship between the variables might not be a 
significant concern. We find high correlation between the number of days with news 
(NEWSDAYS) and the number of news items during the year (YEARNEWS). The Pearson 
correlation coefficient between the two variables is 0.747 and the Spearman rank 
correlation coefficient is 0.946, which indicates that the measurements from these two 
                                                 
15 The sum of average informed trades and uninformed trades is close to but does not exactly equal to the 
average number of trades, which is due to the noise in the estimation of the PIN model.  
16 The mean value of PIN seems to be lower than that reported in Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara (2002). We 
estimated PINs for NYSE common stocks for the period from 1993 to 2001 using our algorithm and 
compared our results with those by Easley et al (2002) from the website of Hvidkjaer. The two sets of PIN 
calculations are of similar magnitude and have very high correlation (over 0.9). The average PIN in our 
sample year (2004) is likely to be lower because PIN decreases over time, especially after the 
decimalization in year 2001.  
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proxies yield similar metrics for the frequency of news release. However, for reasons 
explained in Section 2.1, we conduct our analysis and report results using NEWSDAYS. 
Importantly, the correlation coefficient between the frequency of news release, 
NEWSDAYS, and the proxy for the information asymmetry (PIN) is significantly negative, 
which suggests that frequent news releases mitigate asymmetric information. Finally, 
firms with more frequent news release tend to have more trading, larger size, more 
analysts following, higher price and lower return volatility, all of which conform with 
findings in prior literature.  
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Relationship between the frequency of news release and information asymmetry 
4.1.1 Single equation regression results 
In this section we first present results from estimating equation (2) using OLS in a 
single equation setting. Table 3 shows the results of this estimation. We present three sets 
of results, because VOL and SIZE are highly correlated (Spearman correlation coefficient 
= 0.802). In each of the two specifications where either VOL or SIZE is included 
separately, the coefficient on NEWSDAYS is significantly negative, suggesting that firms 
with greater number of news items are associated with lower information asymmetry. In 
Model 3 where both VOL and SIZE are included simultaneously in the model, the 
coefficient on NEWSDAYS is still statistically significant, although its magnitude is 
slightly smaller (-0.107). As both PIN and NEWSDAYS are logarithm transformed 
variables, the coefficient can be interpreted as an elasticity measure, which indicates that 
one percent increase in NEWDAYS is associated with a decrease of around 10.7 basis 
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points in the PIN. This relationship offers support for the argument by market regulators 
that greater disclosure and public information helps alleviate information asymmetry. 
We also find in Table 3 that the relation between most of the control variables and 
PIN is consistent with findings documented in prior literature. Trading volume is strongly 
negatively related with information asymmetry (PIN), which is consistent with the 
findings in the prior studies (Stoll, 1978; Ho and Stoll, 1980; McInish and Wood, 1992). 
Similar to the findings by Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995) and Roulstone (2003), we 
also find that higher number of analysts following a stock is associated with lower 
information asymmetry. Further, stocks with higher stock price tend to have lower 
information asymmetry (Stoll (1978), Jegadeesh and Subrahmanyam (1993) and Brennan 
and Subrahmanyam (1995)). However, the coefficient on RETVOL is negative, which is 
opposite to the expected sign. Finally, we find that firm size is significantly negatively 
related with information asymmetry, which is consistent with our expectation.  
 
4.1.2 System of equations regression results 
In this section we present the results from estimating the simultaneous system of 
equations (Eq. (2) and (3)) that examines the cross-sectional relationship between the 
frequency of news release and information asymmetry in a multivariate setting. Table 4 
presents the two-stage least square (2SLS) regression results. In the second stage 
equation for the PIN, we find that the coefficient on NEWSDAYS is significantly 
negatively (the coefficient = -0.216 and t-statistic = -3.18), suggesting that firms with 
more frequent news release have lower information asymmetry even after controlling for 
the endogenous relation between the two variables.  
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Turning to the second stage NEWSDAYS equation, we find that after controlling 
for the endogeneity between PIN and NEWSDAYS, NEWSDAYS is significantly and 
negatively related to PIN, which highlights the necessity of addressing the endogenous 
relationship between frequency of news release and information asymmetry. Further, we 
find that firms with higher analysts’ forecast error and new financing activity tend to have 
more frequent news release as the coefficients on FERR and NEWFIN are both 
significantly positive. Our result supports the conjectures made by Brown and Hillegeist 
(2007) that these variables capture the variation in the demand for news, justifying the 
use of these variables as instruments for the frequency of news release. We also find that 
firms that are larger and more actively followed by analysts have more frequent news 
release. However, we find that greater number of institutional holders does not 
necessarily increase public information disclosure since we find that the coefficient on 
NINST is not significantly different from zero. 
In sum, the results documented in Tables 3 and 4 suggest that firms with greater 
frequency of news release are associated with lower information asymmetry. Our next 
step is to examine how this relationship is manifested. The traditional theories of market 
microstructure suggest that greater intensity of informed (uninformed) trading is 
associated with higher (lower) level of information asymmetry (Kyle, 1985; Easley et al, 
1996). We conjecture that different trading intensities of informed and uninformed 
investors in response to news affect the overall information asymmetry in the market. To 
examine this conjecture, we investigate the relationship between frequency of news 
release and trading intensities of informed and uninformed traders separately. 
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4.2 Relationship between the frequency of news release and the intensities of informed 
trading and uninformed trading 
 To study the relation between the frequency of news release and the intensities of 
informed trading and uninformed trading, we first sort firms into three equal-size groups 
based on the frequency of news release and then compare the means and medians of the 
intensities of informed trading (INFORM) and uninformed trading (UNINFORM) across 
the three news groups. As defined in the Section 2, INFORM is the product of the 
probability of a private news event (ALPHA) and the arrival rate of informed trades (MU), 
and UNINFORM  is the arrival rate of uninformed trades (2*EPSILON). The underlying 
parameters, ALPHA, MU and EPSILON, are estimated from the sequential trade model 
described in Easley et al (1996).  
We further refine the above sorting process and incorporate firm size into the 
analysis. We first sort firms into three groups based on SIZE, and within each SIZE group 
we further sort firms into three groups based on NEWSDAYS. Then we compare the 
difference in the means and medians of INFORM and UNINFORM across the 
NEWSDAYS groups within each SIZE group.  
The results are reported in Table 5 where Panel A shows the results for the full 
sample and Panels B to D show results for small, medium and large firms respectively. In 
each panel, columns 2 to 4 report the mean and median (shown in italics) values of the 
trading intensities for firms with low, medium and high frequency of news release. 
Column 5 reports the t-statistic for the test of equality of the mean values of informed and 
uninformed trading intensities between high and low NEWSDAYS firms. And the last 
column reports the z-statistic from the Wilcoxon rank-sum test.  
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 As seen from the table, both the mean and median values (in italics) of INFORM 
and UNINFORM increase with NEWSDAYS. For the full sample, the mean value of 
INFORM almost doubles from 0.391 for low NEWSDAYS firms to 0.73 for high 
NEWSDAYS firms and that of UNINFORM more than triples from 3.409 for low 
NEWSDAYS firms to 11.699 for high NEWSDAYS firms. A similar pattern exists in the 
median values. Both the t-test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test reject the equality of 
values of both INFORM and UNINFORM between high and low NEWSDAYS. Although 
our result suggests that firms with more frequent news release are associated with more 
intense trading by both types of traders, the increase in trading is significantly higher for 
uninformed traders than for informed traders. As a result, the relative trading intensity of 
informed to uninformed, which is the probability of information-based trading (PIN), 
decreases with NEWSDAYS. Turning to Panels B to D, we find that the intensities of both 
informed and uninformed trading are also higher in high NEWSDAYS firms compared 
with low NEWSDAYS firms in each of the three sub samples based on size. Further, we 
also find that the intensity of uninformed trading increases much more significantly with 
NEWSDAYS than the intensity of informed trading in every size sub samples. Therefore, 
our results are not driven by the firms in particular size groups.  
 We reconcile our results with those in previous literature that imply strong 
reaction of uninformed trades to public information. First, our result is consistent with 
uninformed investors relying on public news when making their trading decisions (Lee, 
1992; Barber and Odean, 2008). Our result also suggests that uninformed traders might 
choose to cluster in firms with more frequent news release since a ‘thick’ market can 
reduce the probability of trading against informed traders (Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988). 
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Our findings also do not rule out the possibility that uninformed traders are providing 
liquidity to informed traders around the release of news (Kaniel, Saar, Titman, 2008; 
Kaniel, Liu, Saar, Titman, 2008). As the increase in liquidity also decreases the PIN 
(Easley et al., 1996), our results are also consistent with this conjecture. Prior market 
microstructure literature has conjectured that a greater level of uninformed trading 
relative to informed trading leads to lower information asymmetry (Kyle, 1985; Easley et 
al., 1996). Our empirical finding confirms this conjecture by showing that information 
asymmetry is mitigated due to higher intensity of uninformed relative to informed trading 
in response to the release of public information. Therefore, our findings highlight the 
important role of news release that facilitates the trading by uninformed traders and plays 
an important role in reducing information asymmetry in the market.  
 
4.3 Robustness tests: relationship between the frequency of news release and alternative 
proxies for information asymmetry 
In this section, we present the results of additional tests that examine the 
relationship between the frequency of news release and alternative proxies for 
information asymmetry. Specifically, we replicate the single equation analysis in Section 
4.1 using two alternative proxies for information asymmetries – permanent price impact 
of trades (PPI) and the adverse selection component of bid-ask spread (ASC).  
 Following Hasbrouck (1991), we estimate the permanent price impact of trades 
(PPI) from the impulse-response coefficients between price changes and trading using 




1,1 0t i t i j t j ti j
R a R b X V       (4) 
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2,1 1t k t k l t l tk l
X c R d X V      . (5) 
 
Xt is a vector of trading-related variables which includes a dummy variable indicating 
sign of the trade, the product of sign of the trade and number of shares traded, and the 
product of sign of the trade and square root of number of shares traded to capture the 
decreasing marginal price impact.17 For each trade, we calculate the change in the mid-
point of quotes, Rt, as the difference between the midpoint of first updated quotes within 
5 seconds after the trade and the midpoint of the quotes prevailing when the trade 
occurred. Based on the estimated coefficients of the VAR model in equations (4) and (5), 
we calculate the impulse-response coefficients between trading variables and price 
revisions. The permanent price impact of trades is estimated as the cumulative price 
response to a trading of 1000 shares.18 We scale the cumulative response by the average 
stock price to make it scale-free and comparable across stocks.19  
 We use the adverse selection component of traded spread (ASC) as another proxy 
for information asymmetry, which is estimated from the three-way spread decomposition 
method in Huang and Stoll (1997). They construct a model in which the trade-to-trade 
                                                 
17 We classify each trade into buyer-initiated or seller initiated according to the algorithm developed by Lee 
and Ready (1991).  
18 We calculate the price responses to the given trading impulse after the trading up to 20 steps, and then 
sum up these price responses to obtain the cumulative price response. We stop at 20 steps because the 
response coefficients tend to decay quickly and are negligible beyond 20 steps.  
19 Please refer to Hasbrouck (1991) for more detailed discussion on the construction and estimation of the 
model.  
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price change reflects the information revealed in trading, the compensation for inventory 
cost and order processing cost of market making,  
 
1 2( 1) (1 2 )2 2 2t t t t t
S S SP Q Q Q e            ,  (6) 
 
where ΔPt is the change in transaction price from the previous trade, Qt, Qt-1 and Qt-2 are 
buy-sell trade indicators for the current trade and the last two trades respectively, and et is 
serially uncorrelated public information shock. Estimating Eq. (6) and the autocorrelation 
coefficient of the trade indicator simultaneously yields the estimates of model parameters. 
The set of parameters include the traded spread S and the autocorrelation coefficient of 
trade indicator (1 - 2π). Also included are the adverse selection component α and the 
inventory cost component β, where (1 – α – β) is the order processing cost component of 
the traded spread.20 We are interested in α, the adverse selection component of the traded 
spread (ASC), which is driven by information asymmetry.  
Table 6 shows the results of estimating Eq. (2) using either the permanent price 
impact of trades (PPI) or the adverse selection component of bid-ask spread (ASC).21 For 
simplicity, we only report the coefficient on NEWSDAYS, the variable of interest. We 
find that the coefficient on NEWSDAYS remains statistically negative in both regressions. 
Thus, the regression results using alternative proxies for information asymmetry confirm 
our finding that firms with greater frequency of news release have lower information 
asymmetry.  
                                                 
20 See Huang and Stoll (1997) for more details. on the construction and estimation of the model. 
21 We use Ln(1+ASC) as the dependent variable to maintain its economic interpretation as the percentage of 
bid-ask spread. Adding 1 also helps to solve the issue of negative value of estimated ASC, which is caused 
by the positive serial correlation in order flows.  
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5. Conclusion 
Prior empirical research based on event studies showed that information 
asymmetry increases around event dates such as earnings and dividend announcements. 
However, these empirical results could be driven by informed traders who might react 
more quickly to information than uninformed traders. In contrast, our study examines the 
responses of both informed and uninformed trades to news releases over a longer time 
horizon. We find that firms with more frequent news releases are associated with lower 
information asymmetry. We use three measures of information asymmetry: PIN, the 
permanent price impact and the adverse selection component of bid-ask spread.  
In particular, by decomposing the PIN into trading intensities of informed and 
uninformed traders, we examine why firms with more frequent news releases have lower 
information asymmetry. As the frequency of news release increases, we find that the 
intensity of uninformed trading increases much more than that of informed trading, thus 
lowering the PIN for firms with more frequent news release. Our result holds even after 
controlling for firm size. Thus, our findings not only emphasize the importance of news 
release in leveling the playing field for investors but also highlight the important role of 
uninformed investors in reducing the cost of information asymmetry. Our findings also 
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This table presents the descriptive statistics for a sample of 1031 firms with stocks traded on 
NYSE during the sample year 2004. NEWSDAYS is the number of days with news appearing on 
www.MarketWatch.com for a firm during the sample year. YEARNEWS is the total number of 
news items appearing on www.MarketWatch.com for a firm during the sample year. INFORM is 
the intensity of informed trading, UNINFORM is the intensity of uninformed trading, and PIN is 
the probability of information-based trading defined as the ratio of the informed trading intensity 
to the total trading intensity, all of which are estimated from a sequential trade model described in 
Easley et al (1996) using intraday data in year 2004. VOL is the average of daily number of trades 
during the sample year. SIZE is firm size measured as the average of daily market capitalization 
during the sample year. NANLY is the number of analysts following a firm measured as the 
number of analysts making yearly earnings forecasts for a firm during the sample year. PRICE is 
the average daily closing stock price during the sample year. RETVOL is return volatility 
measured as the standard deviation of daily stock returns during the sample year. NINST is the 
number of institutional investors holding a firm’s stocks at the end of previous year. FERR is the 
analysts’ forecast error measured as the average value of the price-scaled deviation of the 
consensus quarterly earnings forecast in the first month of every quarter from the reported 
quarterly earnings over the 5-year period before the sample year. NEWFIN is a dummy variable 
which equals to one if a firm has any equity issuance above $10 million or any debt issuance 
above $1 million in the fiscal years 2004 and 2005 and zero otherwise.  
 
Variable Mean Std. 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile
NEWSDAYS 57.539 32.182 38 49 66 
YEARNEWS 115.825 141.409 63 86 129 
PIN 0.102 0.056 0.062 0.085 0.126 
INFORM (100s) 0.553 0.260 0.378 0.548 0.706 
UNINFORM (100s) 7.142 5.533 2.883 5.984 10.019 
VOL (100s) 7.815 5.980 3.307 6.585 10.858 
SIZE ($B) 2.587 4.393 0.519 1.153 2.606 
NANLY 7.266 5.558 3 6 11 
PRICE 31.790 34.374 17.713 27.422 39.815 
RETVOL (%) 1.831 0.696 1.324 1.738 2.202 
NINST (100s) 1.576 1.060 0.890 1.330 1.980 
FERR (%) 0.547 0.768 0.151 0.296 0.555 
NEWFIN 0.829 0.376 1 1 1 
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Table 2 
Correlation matrix of variables 
This table reports the correlation coefficients between variables for a sample of 1031 firms with stocks traded on NYSE during the sample year 
2004. NEWSDAYS is the number of days with news appearing on www.MarketWatch.com for a firm during the sample year. YEARNEWS is the 
total number of news items appearing on www.MarketWatch.com for a firm during the sample year. INFORM is the intensity of informed trading, 
UNINFORM is the intensity of uninformed trading, and PIN is the probability of information-based trading defined as the ratio of the informed 
trading intensity to the total trading intensity, all of which are estimated from a sequential trade model described in Easley et al (1996) using 
intraday data in year 2004. VOL is the average of daily number of trades during the sample year. SIZE is firm size measured as the average of daily 
market capitalization during the sample year. NANLY is the number of analysts following a firm measured as the number of analysts making yearly 
earnings forecasts for a firm during the sample year. PRICE is the average daily closing stock price during the sample year. RETVOL is return 
volatility measured as the standard deviation of daily stock returns during the sample year. Pearson correlation coefficients are reported in the 
upper-right block and Spearman ones are reported in the lower-left block in Italic. The p-values of all correlation coefficients are less than 5% 
except for those indicated with asterisk.  
 NEWSDAYS YEARNEWS PIN INFORM UNINFORM VOL SIZE NANLY PRICE RETVOL 
NEWSDAYS  0.747 -0.492 0.564 0.662 0.664 0.561 0.535 0.170 -0.140 
YEARNEWS 0.946  -0.296 0.342 0.422 0.430 0.372 0.326 0.155 -0.087 
PIN -0.654 -0.669  -0.662 -0.726 -0.719 -0.379 -0.584 -0.139 0.053* 
INFORM 0.571 0.564 -0.621  0.864 0.870 0.617 0.656 0.057* -0.259 
UNINFORM 0.683 0.688 -0.908 0.880  0.997 0.720 0.741 0.120 -0.217 
VOL 0.681 0.686 -0.901 0.887 1.000  0.742 0.742 0.118 -0.220 
SIZE 0.548 0.551 -0.709 0.735 0.802 0.802  0.549 0.203 -0.385 
NANLY 0.562 0.549 -0.675 0.670 0.751 0.751 0.697  0.130 -0.262 
PRICE 0.167 0.171 -0.347 0.248 0.330 0.327 0.552 0.327  -0.264 
RETVOL -0.115 -0.120 0.096 -0.275 -0.207 -0.209 -0.580 -0.277 -0.525  
* P-value > 5% 
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Table 3 
Relation between the frequency of news releases and PIN 
This table reports the OLS regression results of the following equation for a sample of 1031 firms 
with stocks traded on NYSE during the sample year 2004,  
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i i i i
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   
   
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PIN is the probability of information-based trading which is estimated from a sequential trade 
model described in Easley et al (1996). NEWSDAYS is the number of days with news appearing 
on www.MarketWatch.com for a firm during the sample year. VOL is the average of daily 
number of trades during the sample year. SIZE is firm size measured as the average of daily 
market capitalization during the sample year. NANLY is the number of analysts following a firm 
measured as the number of analysts making yearly earnings forecasts for a firm during the sample 
year. PRICE is the average daily closing stock price during the sample year. RETVOL is return 
volatility measured as the standard deviation of daily stock returns during the sample year. 
Regression coefficient and the corresponding t-statistics based on robust standard errors are 
reported.  
 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 
Ind. Var. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat.  Coef. T-Stat. 
INTERCEPT 0.681 7.41 0.930 9.15  0.784 9.10 
Ln(NEWSDAYS) -0.122 -6.11 -0.180 -6.97  -0.107 -5.34 
Ln(VOL) -0.337 -23.78    -0.293 -16.20 
Ln(SIZE)   -0.260 -18.86  -0.065 -4.59 
Ln(NANLY) -0.029 -2.26 -0.119 -6.95  -0.022 -1.76 
Ln(PRICE) -0.108 -7.79 -0.081 -3.68  -0.090 -6.30 
Ln(RETVOL) -0.167 -7.48 -0.570 -19.24  -0.253 -9.04 




Relation between the frequency of news releases and PIN: 2SLS regression results 
This table reports the 2SLS regression results of the following equation system for a sample of 
1031 firms with stocks traded on NYSE during the sample year 2004,  
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PIN is the probability of information-based trading which is estimated from a sequential trade 
model described in Easley et al (1996). NEWSDAYS is the frequency of news releases and 
measured as the number of days with news appearing on www.MarketWatch.com for a firm 
during the sample year. VOL is the average of daily number of trades during the sample year. 
SIZE is firm size measured as the average of daily market capitalization during the sample year. 
NANLY is the number of analysts following a firm measured as the number of analysts making 
yearly earnings forecasts for a firm during the sample year. PRICE is the average daily closing 
stock price during the sample year. RETVOL is return volatility measured as the standard 
deviation of daily stock returns during the sample year. NINST is the number of institutional 
investors holding a firm’s stocks at the end of previous year. FERR is the analysts’ forecast error 
measured as the average value of the price-scaled deviation of the consensus quarterly earnings 
forecast in the first month of every quarter from the reported quarterly earnings over the 5-year 
period before the sample year. NEWFIN is a dummy variable which equals to one if a firm has 
any equity issuance above $10 million or any debt issuance above $1 million in the fiscal years 
2004 and 2005 and zero otherwise. INDs are industry dummies that are based on 10-industry 
classification scheme obtained from the website of Kenneth French. 
All variables in the regression are logarithm transformed except for dummy variables. Regression 
coefficient and the corresponding t-statistics based on robust standard error are reported. The 
coefficients of industry dummies in the 2nd equation are not reported. 
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 Dep. Var. = Ln(PIN)  Dep. Var. = Ln(NEWSDAYS) 
Ind. Var. Coef. T-Stat.  Coef. T-Stat. 
INTERCEPT 1.185 7.20  2.770 24.15 
Ln(NEWSDAYS) -0.216 -3.18    
Ln(VOL) -0.306 -14.21    
Ln(SIZE) -0.048 -3.24  0.124 4.74 
Ln(NANLY) -0.005 -0.32  0.72 6.42 
Ln(PRICE) -0.100 -6.06    
Ln(RETVOL) -0.265 -9.63    
Ln(PIN)    -0.318 -4.19 
Ln(NINST)    -0.075 -1.41 
Ln(FERR)    0.091 5.59 
NEWFIN    0.103 2.85 
INDs Not included  Included 
Adj. R2 0.817  0.471 
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Table 5 
Relation between the frequency of news releases and the intensities of informed 
trading and uninformed trading 
This table compares the difference in the intensities of informed trading and uninformed trading 
across firms with different levels of the frequency of news release (NEWSDAYS). NEWSDAYS is 
the number of days with news appearing on www.MarketWatch.com for a firm during the sample 
year. INFORM is the intensity of informed trading and UNINFORM is the intensity of 
uninformed trading, both of which are estimated from the sequential trade model described in 
Easley et al (1996) and expressed in 100 trades. PIN is the probability of information-based 
trading which is calculated as the ratio of the informed trading intensity to the total trading 
intensity, the sum of INFORM and UNINFORM. Firms are sorted into 3 equal-size groups based 
on NEWSDAYS either within the pooled sample or within 3 equal-size groups which are formed 
based on firm size. Then the mean and median (in Italic) values of each variable are reported for 
each group of firms. T is the t-statistic of the test of the null hypothesis that the mean values are 
the same for both high NEWSDAYS firms and low NEWSDAYS firms (High – Low = 0). 
Wilcoxon Z is the z-statistic of Wilcoxon rank-sum test (also called Mann-Whitney test) of the 
null hypothesis that the sample of high NEWSDAYS firms is drawn from the same population as 
the sample of low NEWSDAYS firms. All the test statistics are significant at less than 1% level.  
 
Panel A: all firms 
 NEWSDAYS High - Low 
 Low Medium High T-stat. Wilcoxon Z 
INFORM 0.391 0.545 0.730 19.65 16.04 
0.385 0.531 0.712   
UNINFORM 3.409 6.421 11.699 23.76 18.71 
2.730 5.883 11.326   
PIN 0.143 0.094 0.068 -20.85 -18.33 
0.131 0.085 0.061   
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Panel B: small firms 
 NEWSDAYS High - Low 
 Low Medium High T-stat. Wilcoxon Z 
INFORM 0.256 0.337 0.429 7.87 7.16 
0.227 0.336 0.418   
UNINFORM 1.688 2.450 4.037 8.79 8.10 
1.143 2.152 3.629   
PIN 0.178 0.153 0.114 -8.58 -7.57 
0.166 0.145 0.102   
 
Panel C: medium firms 
 NEWSDAYS High - Low 
 Low Medium High T-stat. Wilcoxon Z 
INFORM 0.509 0.559 0.607 4.33 3.73 
0.507 0.545 0.586   
UNINFORM 4.652 6.406 8.096 8.67 7.73 
4.195 5.944 7.466   
PIN 0.115 0.089 0.076 -8.66 -8.10 
0.116 0.084 0.071   
 
Panel D: large firms 
 NEWSDAYS High - Low 
 Low Medium High T-stat. Wilcoxon Z 
INFORM 0.647 0.770 0.867 7.87 7.20 
0.645 0.776 0.888   
UNINFORM 8.832 12.644 15.501 11.05 9.48 
8.581 11.967 15.031   
PIN 0.079 0.061 0.055 -7.41 -7.24 




Relation between the frequency of news releases and information asymmetry: 
Robustness tests using alternative proxies of information asymmetry 
This table reports the OLS regression results of the following equation for a sample of 1031 firms 
with stocks traded on NYSE during the sample year 2004,  
 
0 1 2 3
4 5 6
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
i i i i
i i i i
Ln IA Ln NEWSDAYS Ln VOL Ln SIZE
Ln NANLY Ln PRICE Ln RETVOL
   
   
   
    . 
 
The proxies of information asymmetry include: 1) PPI, the permanent price impact of a 1000-
share trade which is estimated based on a VAR equation system of stock trades and quote 
revisions developed by Hasbrouck (1991); and 2) ASC, the adverse selection component of the 
traded spread which is estimated based on the spread decomposition procedure in Huang and 
Stoll (1997). NEWSDAYS is the number of days with news appearing on www.MarketWatch.com 
for a firm during the sample year. VOL is the average of daily number of trades during the sample 
year. SIZE is firm size measured as the average of daily market capitalization during the sample 
year. NANLY is the number of analysts following a firm measured as the number of analysts 
making yearly earnings forecasts for a firm during the sample year. PRICE is the average daily 
closing stock price during the sample year. RETVOL is return volatility measured as the standard 
deviation of daily stock returns during the sample year. Only the regression coefficient on 
Ln(NEWSDAYS) and the corresponding t-statistics based on robust standard error are reported. 
 
Panel A: Measuring information asymmetry as PPI 
 Dep. Var. = Ln(PPI) 
Ind. Var. Coef. T-stat. Adj. R2 
Ln(NEWSDAYS) -0.052 -4.61 0.950 
 
Panel B: Measuring information asymmetry as ASC 
 Dep. Var. = Ln(1+ASC) 
Ind. Var. Coef. T-stat. Adj. R2 
Ln(NEWSDAYS) -0.053 -4.02 0.296 
 
 
 
